Rezanov, perhaps, would like to remove him, but the deadlines do not allow: the situation will drag on. It is already tightened: ships stood in Brazil an unforeseen time, when being repaired; then - re-planned transition to Petropavlovsk (instead of Japan).

Necessary to hurry with the embassy.

The captains had already shown their qualifications, and it was clear that the success of the expedition was real.

Rezanov could not boast of any achievements at the time of the conflict settlement in Kamchatka.

If really in Brazil Rezanov had sent in St. Petersburg the reports about the "disobedience" of the captains , he could expect some kind of response, arriving to Kamchatka. (This argument, of course, conjectural. The author has no information on the speed of movement of mail).

But in any case, information sources do not contain information about Rezanov's obtaining in Kamchatka any clear answers from St. Petersburg on his reports regarding the "disobedience" of captains.

The threat of captains ' resignation and the unclear reaction of the imperial management to Rezanov's messages were one of latent culminating points of an expedition.

Rezanov realized that need to "take back".

Rezanov accepts the apology of Kruzenshtern. The Embassy ends in relative failure. Japanese Emperor not accepted the gifts, did not agree on the establishment of diplomatic relations. In general, this was not some special failure. Such was the policy of Japan. Japan at that time "distanced itself" from all European countries (except the Holland).

The failure of the embassy mission - if it had happened immediately after the conflict with Kruzenshtern - Rezanov could interpret in different ways, including redirecting some share of responsibility to Kruzenshtern. But formal reconciliation in Kamchatka took place. Ryazanov had no reason to criticize Kruzenshtern.

Of course, in Russia was hoping for success of the embassy mission , but, on the other hand, Japan's policy and position were not secrets to anyone. Most likely, Emperor Alexander I took into account the possibility of failure as very real. And the results of the embassy mission did not upset him.

The intolerable situation on the ship around Rezanov, the relative failure of the embassy. Rezanov appears in the role of an unsuccessful ambassador.

Objectively, he's nothing to blame.

Rezanov moves down out from the ship (1805).

Goes to Alaska. There - 'Neva'. Yu.F. Lisyansky learns about upcoming arrival of Rezanov. But time doesn't wait. Lisyansky hurries to China, to the Canton.

Rezanov remains in Alaska. Remains as a person with double problems: (1) The history of the conflict on the ship and (2) the relative failure of the embassy.

Rezanov comes back through Siberia to St. Petersburg.

Objectively he isn't guilty of anything. And formally there was nothing to accuse him. A person with less self-esteem, perhaps, would have experienced the situation more easily.

Naturally, position of the person who hasn't achieved success doesn't add vital forces. The en route N.P. Rezanov is dying (1807).

And at Rezanov's presence on "Hope", and at his absence, the psychological mechanism a Troyecentricity, launched by a wise Sphinx, continues to operate successfully in the direction of creation of success.

According to some references in the books by I. F. Kruzenshtern and Y. F. Lisyansky it can be concluded that "Neva" showed great rapidity (compared with "Hope"). (Competently was repaired? Impact of the shipbuilder's knowledges?)

Yu.F. Lisyansky writes in the book:

"April 15. Wind is fresh, the South East, the weather is cloudy. The ship "Hope" has disappeared from sight. At night, by cannon shots and flares, I let him know about the place where we were. In the morning I used all the diligence him to find, but my efforts remained vain. By noon a dense fog appeared and forced me to keep the proper course, especially as the wind blew a favorable one, which must be used where several hours sometimes give the greatest difference in swimming. So, this is the third time we are separated in a sudden way.

(...)

April 24. Today we can congratulate myself that not only safely bypassed the southernmost tip of Africa, but also received the South East trade winds.

Having examined amount of food, I saw that, at the economic use, them would be enough for three months. Believing that during this time we can reach Europe, I decided to abandon my previous intention to go to Saint Helena island, and sent my way straight to England, being sure that such a brave enterprise will give us great honor. Still any the seafarer did not venture such long journey, without rest in port.

To this bold feat I was motivated also by the very desire of my subordinates, who, being in perfect health, only thought about it, to distinguish themselves by something extraordinary.

I regretted only for one that the similar travel has to separate us from the "Hope" ship before our arrival in Russia. But what to do? Having an opportunity to prove to the world that we deserve fully that power of attorney, what was rendered to us by the Fatherland, it was impossible not to sacrifice this pleasure" [8].

Events are described also by I.F. Kruzenshtern:

"April. 15

(...) ... But despite this fresh prosperous wind, we were separated from "Neva".

(...)

I have made many times the signal cannon shots, and in the course of the night we burned flares every two hours, but never received any sort of answer, and we were desperate to connect with Neva until the arrival of our to the Saint Helena island, as the place appointed for the connection.

(...)

April 26 th we saw two ships... First, we have recognized the "Neva", but as "Hope" went worse; the "Neva" soon gone again from sight, and we have not seen prior to our arrival in Kronstadt. (...)

Our four-day stay at Saint Helena ... (...)

When I received reliable news about the war that had begun between Russia and France, I regretted much, that Lisyansky, without having complied my appointment, did not come to Saint Helena's island. Mutual safety demanded to be without fail to us now together. However, the passports given us from the French government, encouraged safety from acts of warships, with us; however we could expect opposite from privateers. These quite often do not respect even commands of the government. Throughout the current war was many examples proving a variety of their thoughts from chiefs of warships. (...)

In those circumstances I did not consider reliable to pass the English Channel, on which mostly French privateers cruise.

And so, bypassing the Azores, we directed the course to the northernmost tip of Scotland in order that, having floated between it and Orkney Islands to enter the North Sea. This way had to be more long, as it was confirmed and in fact; but I recognized it the most reliable on circumstances" [13].