Chapter 6. Red Button
One morning meeting of the Center Zero council, Yuri Vasilyevich began with an unplanned topic.
– We will soon have to make a decision on one of the components of the Perimeter system. I hope everyone has familiarized themselves with the documents? Our chief expert in this field points to the need to introduce one more, official post with a nuclear terminal. Let me remind you that, in addition to the three official ones, there are two more secret ones controlling the first three posts No. 1. An exception is the Soviet-era Perimeter system, which, in the event of the death of the country's leadership, presupposes a decision to launch a nuclear strike by a group of combat duty officers. This system is also in effect in modern Russia. The terminal stores the codes to activate the nuclear arsenal. Using the nuclear suitcase, the top official contacts the strategic missile forces and orders a nuclear strike. The President's nuclear suitcase is part of the Kazbek automated control system for strategic nuclear forces. The suitcase is set up with a special conference call that cannot be jammed or blocked. There are missile warning stations on the Russian border that monitor the situation via satellite communications. If a nuclear missile launch toward Russia is detected, the data is transmitted to a central command center where the top military commanders are on duty around the clock. Information about an attack is cross-checked through other channels. After the missile aggression is confirmed, the duty officer puts all three suitcases on alert. With this signal, the order is given to unlock the missiles, and the duty officers on the launchers press the buttons. The signal must be sent exactly from the three suitcases. Only then will the system be activated. The officers accompanying the first responders with the nuclear suitcase in their hands are called operators. The operator is required to be in close proximity to the official. I'm done. Any questions, suggestions?
Yuri Vasilyevich fell silent.
– Yes," replied the Head of the Department for Control of Censorship of Ethno-cultural and Political Information on Africa and Asia.
Vasilievich looked at her in silence.
– I suggest that this issue be left to the decision of the heads of the military and power block.
– Thank you, I understand you," replied the head of the center, paused for a moment and concluded: "This is a political decision. We will consider the decision taken. Let's move on to another topic. And it is as follows: "The consequences of the changes in the internal and foreign policy of Greece after the introduction of new canons, changes in the catechism of the Church and the corresponding ethno-cultural and moral-spiritual postulates".
***
Another morning, Vasilievich followed Rutra into the office and announced that they needed to go to a special room styled like a UN employee's office.
– There will now be a videoconference with the General Staff, the Federation Council, the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Presidential Administration on the report of the United States Department of State on the exchange of telemetry information and the implementation of the START III Treaty. Russia's representative to the UN is reporting. According to the legend, we are employees of the UN Commission. Get used to it, but don't get used to speaking English.
– That's right," Ruthra replied jokingly.
– You give me a break with this stuff, or you'll get me a nunnery. We're on, automatic translation system is working.
Faces appeared on the screens, assistants were making connections, greetings passed.
A U.N. official began the report:
– The U.S. State Department has provided a briefing on the progress of the implementation of the U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (START-3). According to this information, Moscow had 1,492 deployed nuclear warheads at the start of the treaty, while Washington had 1,737. According to the US State Department's data on the progress of START-3 implementation, the United States has 760 nuclear warhead carriers in service, while Russia has 523. The number of warheads on deployed carriers is 1,534 for the United States and 1,645 for Russia.
After listing many details, the speaker stated.
– The report is over, thank you for your attention.
There was a moment of silence. It was obvious from the faces of the participants that they wanted to end the conference as soon as possible.
– We, as UN representatives, should ask something, clarify. Ask something," Vasilyevich whispered to Rutra.
Rutra looked at him questioningly, but he was not confused, nodded, and, after quickly reviewing the entire report, asked about the numbers that interested him because of their inconsistencies with START-3.
– Please explain the following point," Rutra began his question in English. – You said that the United States has 760 deployed nuclear warhead carriers, while Russia has 523.
– Yes, it turns out so. I note that this is according to the US State Department.
– And you said that Washington is satisfied with the way START-3 is being implemented.
– Yes, such a statement was made.
Yuri Vasilyevich stepped lightly on Rutra's heel. Rutra took the hint and said:
– Thank you, I'm all set.
– Any other questions? – asked a representative of the Presidential Administration.
Everyone was silent.
– Since there are no questions, I suggest that we work through the program to clarify data, extent, and prospects for implementation before the next meeting, which will be in six months. Notification will be sent out in advance.
– Invite a representative of the U.S. State Department to the next meeting," Yury Vasilyevich suggested unexpectedly.
– Put it in the minutes," a representative of the Presidential Administration pointed to someone. – Any other suggestions, questions?
Everyone was silent.
– I declare this regular meeting adjourned. Thank you, goodbye! – said the representative of the Presidential Administration.
– Goodbye! Goodbye! – came from the speakers.
The monitor turned off.
– Now that's the time to check out all these organizations.
– The State Department, too? – Rutra asked, smiling.
– Also," Vasilievich replied seriously.
Chapter 7.
The Doomsday Problem
Rutra became increasingly aware that the true purpose of their organization was, to put it mildly, a little different. After the assertion of the U.S. State Department vetting, this became clear. "So who will be vetting him? In what role?" – Rutra asked himself.
Vasilievich noticed this and gestured him to the corridor. They silently went there, then went into the elevator and, having gone down, came out at a small dark station. It wasn't a station as such; there were no tracks, tunnels, or locomotive cars. It was a large room with dim lighting; there was a single sliding iron door on the opposite wall from the elevator. Beside this door was a small bench on which they sat down.
Vasilievich smoked occasionally, very high quality rare cigarettes. Now he took out a cigarette. Rutra did not smoke, but he could afford to smoke "very high quality, rare cigarettes," as he put it, "once every five years," so he did not refuse the chief's offer. After the second puff, Vasilievich began the conversation in the tone of a veteran who had lived a long life: