This book presents a comprehensive view of recent developments in the theory of international trade agreements and political economy, by focusing on research by Raymond Riezman. This pioneering work introduced terms of trade effects and strategic behavior to the theory of international trade agreements. This is complemented by a careful analysis of how politics affects international trade agreements.The book brings together work which focuses on the question of why international trade agreements occur and what forms they take.Contents:Tariffs and Trade Agreements:A 3X3 Model of Customs UnionsTariff Retaliation from a Strategic ViewpointCustoms Unions and the CoreDo Big Countries Win Tariff Wars?Optimal Tariff Equilibria with Customs UnionsDynamic Tariffs with Asymmetric InformationUnderstanding the Welfare Implications of Preferential Trade AgreementsA Strategic and Welfare Theoretic Analysis of Free Trade AreasHow Often are Propositions on the Effects of Regional Trade Agreements Theoretical Curiosa?Free Trade: What are the Terms-of-Trade Effects?Political Economy and Voting Models:Voter Preferences for Trade Policy InstrumentsSeniority in LegislaturePolitical Reform and Trade PolicyThe Sources of Protectionist Drift in Representative DemocraciesMinorities and Storable VotesInternational Trade Topics:Uncertainty and the Choice of Trade Policy in Oligopolistic IndustriesAn Experimental Investigation of the Patterns of International TradeThe Principles of Exchange Rate Determination in an International Finance ExperimentTrade Shocks and Macroeconomic Fluctuations in AfricaTrade, and the Distribution of Human CapitalReadership: Graduates and researchers in international economics; professionals and policy makers involved in decisions related to international trade; general public interested in political economy.