This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.Contents:Limits, Continuity and Robustness:Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games (D Fudenberg & D K Levine)Limit Games and Limit Equilibria (D Fudenberg & D K Levine)Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Many Players (D Fudenberg & D K Levine)Finite Player Approximations to a Continuum of Players (D Fudenberg & D K Levine)On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements (D Fudenberg et al.)When are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? (D Fudenberg et al.)Reputation Effects:Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player (D Fudenberg & D K Levine)Maintaining a Reputation When Strategies are Imperfectly Observed (D Fudenberg & D K Levine)Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent (M Celentani et al.)When is Reputation Bad? (J Ely et al.)Repeated Games:The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information (D Fudenberg & E Maskin)The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information (D Fudenberg et al.)Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players (D Fudenberg & D K Levine)An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information (D Fudenberg & D K Levine)The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games (D Fudenberg & D K Levine)Perfect Public Equilibria When Players are Patient (D Fudenberg et al.)Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring (D Fudenberg & D K Levine)Readership: Graduate students and researchers in game theory.